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ABSTRACT

Previous online reputation research has been focused on the effects of positive and negative reputations on trust
formation, trading price, and probability of sale. We propose that negative feedback rate (NFR) is the most important
indicator of the risk of buying from a seller online. This proposition has been supported by an empirical study based on
data collected from eBay.com. We found that the 6-month NFR in the current period predicts much better the future risk
measured by the NFR in the next 6-month period than did net reputation score and negative reputation score. A seller’s
life-long negative score in fact was not significant in predicting the future risk. In addition, a seller’s age in the market
was found to have similar predicting power on risk as did net reputation score.
Keywords: Reputation; Electronic commerce; Risk; C2C auction
1.

INTRODUCTION

The prevailing online reputation systems, which provide
trust-building mechanisms and assurance services on
eBay, Yahoo auction, Amazon and many other online
auction marketplaces, have contributed significantly to
the success of the consumer-to-consumer (C2C)
electronic commerce. The online reputation systems
allow traders to leave each other a positive, negative or
neutral rating after a transaction is finished. The scores
are then added up as quantitative indicators of traders’
reputation records which are available to future traders.
In addition, traders can leave brief comments on their
transactions or trading partners for further references.
The effectiveness of online reputation systems in the
C2C auction market has triggered wide interests from
the research community. According to the synthesis by
Dellarocas [4], although some have investigated the
effect on the probability of selling products [2],
empirical studies on online reputation are unanimously
focused on the effect of seller’s feedbacks on item
prices. However, because of the diverse nature of
research design, such as different types and categories
of items being investigated, different measures of
reputation, different data collection processes, and
different sample sizes, no consistent findings were
found across these studies [13]. Positive feedback might
or might not increase price or probability of sale, and
the same applies to negative feedback and net reputation
score, as Resnick et al. [13] summarize from 16
research reports. Whereas, accumulated positive and
negative scores, as well as negative scores from a period
of time, were found to be the most influencing
*

components of seller’s reputation on buyer behavior.
On the other hand, some research has investigated the
effect of risk or perceived risk on online trading and the
adoption of trusted third party services (e.g., Antony et
al. [1]; Hu et al. 2001 [7]). Perceived risk was identified
as an important determinant of purchasing items and
adopting trusted third parties’ services in the electronic
market. Further, perceived risk is subject to change with
regard to each trading partner’s online reputation.
The basic reputation indicators that can be obtained
from a C2C online reputation system include positive
score, negative score, and neutral score (less often used).
Based on these three basic scores, three combination
scores can be derived: the total reputation score which
is the sum of positive, negative and neutral scores, the
net reputation score which is the difference of positive
score and negative score accumulated from the ratings
from unique traders, and the negative feedback rate
which the ratio of negative score and the total reputation
score. Presently, a majority of reported research uses
positive, negative, and net reputation scores as the
indicators of online reputation, but NFR has not been
touched yet.
How do these reputation scores reflect the risk of
trading with a seller? To our knowledge, little research
has answered this question. So far, majority research
effort is in the effect of reputation on trust, but not
aimed at the measure of the risk in the C2C online
transactions. The main research idea in this paper is
described in Figure 1. In the dotted box of the figure is a
typical model used in trust related research (see [8]),
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where perceived risk is investigated. However, the
perceived risk does not necessarily match the real risk in
the future, because online traders’ behavior could be
irrational. Therefore, this paper is intended to
investigate the relationship between reputation
indicators and the risk. We propose that a seller’s
negative feedback rate (NFR) is the most important
indicator for predicting the risk of buying from him.
Based on data collected from eBay, we conducted an
empirical study. The result supported our proposition.
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Attitude
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Figure 1: A conceptual model of the research
2.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

2.1 Reputation
In the traditional reputation literature, reputation is
generally defined as the consistency of an entity’s
behavior over a certain period of time [3][5][14]. It is a
record of the history of an entity’s interactions with
others. Thus, reputation building is not a one-time effort
but is based on the sum of all the past behaviors of the
entity.
Reputation can be positive or negative. A positive
reputation manifests all the favorable assessment of an
entity, while a negative reputation shows the
unfavorable aspects of the entity. Because the potential
sacrifice associated with a negative or bad reputation is
very high, an entity with a positive reputation is
predicted to behave consistently in a favorable manner
in the future. In buyer-seller relationships, the seller’s
reputation has a positive effect on buyer’s trust in the
seller and buyer’s long-term orientation with the seller
[6].
In electronic commerce research, Internet buyers are
found to favor web sites that sell familiar products
manufactured by familiar merchants [12]. The
reputation of an online store is positively associated
with an online consumer’s trust in the store [8]. Further,
research has shown that the negative reputation has
much more effect than the positive reputation on buyers’
trust because the negative reputation is the repeatedly
appearance of a seller’s unfavorable behavior that is
highly associated with the potential trading risk in the
future (See the review from Dellarocas [4] and Resnick
et al. [13]).
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2.2 Risk
According to classical decision theory, risk is “the
variance of the probability distribution of possible gains
and losses associated with a particular alternative” ([11],
pp.1404). The definition is too abstract for the traders in
the C2C auction market to understand. Following
MacCrimmon and Wehrung [10], risk is defined as the
chance or probability of loss. We thus define the
potential risk of trading with a seller to be the
probability of leaving the seller a negative feedback.
Although the reputation system provides detailed
comments about the negative reputation, a potential
buyer may not have the resources (cognitive,
motivational, or other external resources) to search the
entire archive and find out the exact reasons for the
negative comments. Further, risk is also associated with
the significance of loss [11], e.g., how much a buyer can
lose because of fraud.
2.3 The rationale of the research
In this research we focus on how online negative
reputation can indicate the real risk in a future online
transaction. This issue is represented by the question
mark in Figure 1. Normally, a reputation system does
not provide a direct causal link between the historical
negative feedbacks and the information about the
auctioned item, so that a buyer could not easily figure
out the probability of future loss. Hence, we argue that a
potential buyer will rely on the summarized reputation
information in a seller’s profile to judge the risk level of
trading with the seller. The definition we have provided
implies that risk is in the form of probability rather than
a quantitative number representing the value of the loss.
In the C2C online auction context, previous research has
used negative feedback scores to measure risk. This
measure is not accurate, because a negative feedback
score does not reflect the probability of getting negative
feedback in the future. The right measure of such risk
should be a number signaling the probability of
unpleasant consequences from the transaction with the
involved seller. Thus, both the number of negative
feedbacks the seller has received in a period of time and
the total number of transactions in the same period of
time should be considered together. We realize that there
are several different types of NFRs, e.g., lifetime NFR
and NFRs during different time periods. They are
applicable to the same risk analysis purpose depending
on different timeframes and accuracies. In the later
discussion, we refer NFR as the NFR calculated from
reputation scores in a 6-month period from now on.
3. AN EMPIRICAL STUDY
In this section, we report an empirical study based on
data collected from eBay.com. The purpose of the
empirical study is twofold. First, we aim to reveal the
nature of the negative feedbacks through a content
analysis of the feedback comments. We have not seen

870

The Fourth International Conference on Electronic Business (ICEB2004) / Beijing

any effort of analyzing the diverse contents of the
reputation feedbacks. Second, we want to justify the
predictive power of different reputation scores on the
risk in the transactions with unknown sellers through a
longitudinal study, using reputation score data collected
at two time points.

such as “shipped to wrong address”, “item received
more than a month”, or “never response to my email”.
Apparently these complaints are not related to any fraud,
but reflect buyers’ unpleasant experience. Thus, this
type of risk is about unsatisfactory transaction that every
buyer wants to avoid.

3.1 Study 1 - Content Analysis of Negative Feedback
Comments

According to the responses from the seller, the buyer
could be the number one trouble maker followed by the
seller and the third party.

For the content analysis, we randomly collected 216
unique sellers with negative reputation scores. We
searched these 216 seller’s transactional history
archived on eBay.com. We randomly selected one piece
of feedback comment associated with a negative rating
to the seller.
As each online negative feedback may link to different
stories and signal different types of perceived risks, such
as financial losses, undesired low quality, and
unsatisfied service, it is necessary to look into negative
complaints in order to reveal their nature. We are
interested in why buyers are unhappy with sellers and
how buyers attribute those complaints.
The authors of this paper worked as independent coders
of the feedback comments. After finishing coding two
coders compared the results and resolved the differences
and discrepancies with a detailed discussion. The
reliability of inter-coders was 0.90.
The coding was focused on three basic questions: What
are the causes of negative feedback, merchandize or
service? Who are responsible for the negative feedback,
the seller, the buyer, or the third party? Is the negative
feedback resolvable?

Others, 1.85%

There are many attribution errors in the negative
feedbacks left by the buyer. According to Table 1, more
than one third of complaints are because of the buyer.
Typically, an inexperienced buyer may not understand
the information of the auctioned item well and does not
follow the way as an experienced buyer does. This is
particularly remarkable in the complaints about the
merchandise. Although this is not the kind of the risk in
the traditional sense, the over reaction of a buyer may
incur the retaliation of the annoyed seller returning with
a negative rating. So the backfiring from the seller or
uncomfortable feeling of the regrettable outcome is the
risk the buyer may face under this situation.
Table 1. The liable agents to the complaints
Complained
issues
Merchandise
Service
Overall

Seller

Buyer
38.36%
28.79%

3rd
party
15.07%
19.70%

18.49%
12.12%
16.20%

Others
28.08%
39.39%

36.11%

16.20%

31.49%

In addition, about one sixth of the complaints are related
to the third party who provides delivery services,
contracted packing services, or original product supply
(Figure 3). Although this also has nothing to do with
fraud, it is one kind of risks that a buyer may encounter.
As shown in Table 1, sellers are responsible for less than
half of the complaints as buyers are.

Service,
30.56%

Merchandise,
67.59%

Figure 2: Causes of complaints

Others,
31.49%

3rd party,
16.20%

Seller, 16.20%

Buyer, 36.11%

Results and Implications
The results of the coding on the three questions are
shown in Figure 2-4 and Table 1. The three findings are
discussed as follows:
Not every complaint is related to a merchandise
problem
Figure 2 indicates that about two thirds of negative
comments are complaints against merchandise problems.
More than 30% complaints are related to seller services,

Figure 3: The composition of liable agents
More than 40% of the complaints are resolvable or have
been resolved at the moment they are made.
Figure 4 shows that more than half of the complaints
can be classified as disputes. Sellers are responsible for
almost half of complaints (47.95%) to merchandises.
Less than one fifth (18.49%) of the complaints against
the merchandise has caused sellers’ harsh responses and
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ended unpleasantly. Practically, when a seller has
responded to a buyer’s complaint regarding the
merchandise and a dispute is incurred, it becomes
difficult to justify whether the case is a fraud or not.
From a prospective buyer’s angle, this is an undesirable
situation and must be avoided.
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collected 2,000 seller’s reputation data in March 2003.
Six months later, we repeated the data collection using
the same 2,000 seller IDs. 174 sellers IDs were no
longer active in the second round collection because
these sellers have quitted the account, leaving 1,826
useful observations in the study.
Results

Resolvable,
44.44%
Dispute,
55.56%

Figure 4: The resolvability of negative comments
3.2 Study 2 - Predictors of NFR
For the longitudinal analysis, we followed the data
collection procedure reported in Lin et al. [9]. We first

We tested how well the reputation indicators observed
in the current 6-month period (t0), i.e., NFR, net
reputation score, accumulated negative feedback, and
age, can predict an individual seller’s NFR in the next
6-month period (t1). We used stepwise regression to
examine the correlation of the NFR in the next period to
different reputation indicators. The results from the
Tobit regression model and the OLS model are
summarized in Table 2. Tobit regression model was
used because the dependent variable NFR at the second
point (t1) was censored with a lot of 0’s. In general, the
regression results from the two models are consistent.

Table 2: Regression analysis of predictors of NFR in the next 6-month period
Dependent: NFR(t1)
Tobit Model
Model 1

Ln(NFR(t0))
0.87

Model 2

Age

Ln(Net(t0))

Ln( Neg(t0))

-0.0009

Model 3

-0.40

Model 4

-0.01ns

Model 5

0.82

Model 6

0.78

-0.0004
-0.15

Model 7

0.89

Model 8

0.78

-0.0003

Model 9

0.84

-0.0004

Model 10

0.69

-0.0003

OLS
Model 1

Ln(NFR(t0))
0.87

Age

Model 2

-0.11 ns
-0.10

0.78

Model 7

0.89

Model 8

0.78

-0.0003

Model 9

0.84

-0.0004

Model 10

0.69

-0.0003

-1205.80

1826

-1031.06

1826

-627.03

1826

-627.55

1826

-633.27
-622.96
-625.38

-0.22

0.12 ns

1826

-621.50

Ln(Net(t0))

Ln( Neg(t0))

N
468

R
0.5854

468

0.1252

0.01 ns
0.82

-1281.76

1826

1826

Model 4
Model 6

1826

-0.06 ns

-0.44

Model 5

Log Likelihood
-640.40

1826

-0.001

Model 3

N
1826

-0.0004
-0.15

468

0.2408

468

0.0002

468

0.6084

468

0.6076

-0.11 ns

468

0.5979

468

0.6152

-0.06 ns

468

0.6112

0.12 ns

468

0.6176

-0.10
-0.22

2

ns: non-significant; All the other coefficients are significant at the 0.001 level
Implications
Seller’s current NFR is the most significant variable for
predicting the NFR in the next period
The most important predictor of future risk is the NFR
in the current 6-month period, which explains the
highest percentage of the variance of the next period

NFR (R2 is about 59% from the OLS regression) among
the four independent variables. This means that the NFR
is the best among all four variable in predicting the risk
of trading with an unknown seller in the C2C online
auction market. The positive relationship suggests that
the higher the NFR from the current period, the higher
the NFR in the next period. The contribution of the
other three variables in explaining the risk level is
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marginal because their presence has little effect on the
goodness of fit (for example, 63% vs. 59% of R2 in the
OLS regression, or -640 vs. –627 of logarithmic
likelihood in the Tobit regression).
Net reputation score is negatively correlated to seller’s
NFR in the next period
The relationship between net reputation score and NFR
is significantly negative, suggesting that the higher the
net reputation score, the lower the NFR in the next
period. This finding is consistent with the findings
reported in previous literature, in which net reputation
score has a significant effect on trust and price premium.
Therefore, our study suggests that net reputation is also
a significant predictor for the trading risk with a specific
seller. However, the explanatory power of net reputation
score (R2 is about 24% in the OLS regression) is not as
strong as NFR.
An explanation to the discrepancy of the effect of net
reputation score is that when the net reputation score is
high, the variance of NFR is low, because sellers with
high net reputation scores tend to have high transaction
volumes and their NFRs are relatively stable. The sellers
with low net reputation score typically have lower
transaction volume, and the variance of their NFRs is
higher. Therefore, the NFR is more sensitive to the
range of net reputation scores.
Seller’s age matters in predicting NFR
The age of a seller also provides the similar explanatory
power in predicting NFR (R2 is about 13% in the OLS
regression) as the net reputation score. This implies that
the longer a seller stays on the market, the lower the
NFR. Therefore, like net reputation score, a seller’s age
can be another important measure of his experience and
tenure in the market. According to Lin et al. [9], in the
context of market structure research, online reputation
as the tangible asset for online traders reflect their
capacity as virtual firms in the electronic market. Based
on this, our study is the first one that has found that age
is an effective measure of a seller’s capacity in doing
business on the market.
A seller’s total negative score accumulated in his
business life cycle has no effect on NFR
Unlike previous studies who have found significant
effects of negative feedback on person’s trust and price,
this study did not find significant effect of negative
reputation score on the next period NFR (p>0.05). This
suggests that without considering the total number of
transactions from which the negative reputation score
are generated, the risk in a trading cannot be predicted
accurately. Negative reputation score, an absolute
number rather than a relative number, cannot tell exactly
whether it is likely to have an unpleasant outcome in the
transaction with a seller. The previously reported
significance of negative reputation score on traders’

behavior was only the implication of their irrationality.
According to the above findings, the maturity of a seller,
signaled by his age and net reputation score, is
important for estimating the risk level in transacting
with him. We can refer to this as the “learning effect.”
The learning effect was also found from the negative
relationship between transaction volume and negative
rate (β=-0.0002, p<0.001 R2=0.10). The higher the
number of transactions, the lower the NFR. Although an
individual may maximize his effort to conduct a good
business, his behavior is relatively consistent. If he has
got higher NFR in the past, he is more likely to get
higher NFR in the future. This implies that even though
a trader changes his ID or identities on eBay, if he has
got a high NFR, he is still likely to get the same level of
NFR under a new ID, because his ability of doing
business behind the pseudonym is unimproved. At the
same time, the costs of switching ID and building new
reputation may be high, which suggests to the sellers:
Do not change your ID when you have a high NFR. It
does not work.
4. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we analyzed the negative feedbacks by
coding the textual complaint data and examined the
determinants of future NFR with the historical
reputation scores. We made two clear contributions to
the research on C2C auction market. First, we revealed
the diverse nature of negative reputation. Several
important findings were derived from analyzing the
content of the negative feedback comments. Second, we
proposed to use NFR to measure the potential risk in
trading with an unknown seller in the electronic market.
The results of the empirical study could provide
guidelines for the future buyers to do business online.
The findings also have important implications for the
design of reputation systems. Online companies are
encouraged to report NFR as a measure of reputation of
traders. We have noticed that since 2004 eBay.com has
started to provide positive feedback rate on its online
reputation forum (see Appendix). We reason that the
positive feedback rate (PFR) might work as an incentive
for sellers to maintain their reputation and promote the
effectiveness of eBays’ feedback forum. However, PFR
is not as straightforward as NFR as an indicator of the
risk, although rational buyers can derive NFR from PFR.
If eBay.com can further show the positive feedback rate
during a period of one month and 6-month, the figures
will be more informative and valuable.
REFERENCES
[1] Antony, S., Z. Lin, and B. Xu, “Determinants of
Online Escrow Service Adoption: An Experimental
Study,” The Proceedings of the 11th Workshop on
Information Technology and Systems (WITS’01),
2001, pp71-76.

The Fourth International Conference on Electronic Business (ICEB2004) / Beijing
[2] Ba, S., and P. A. Pavlou, “Evidence of the Effect of
Trust Building Technology in Electronic Markets:
Price Premiums and Buyer Behavior,” MIS
Quarterly 26(3), 2002, pp243-268.
[3] Balachander, S., “Warranty Signaling and
Reputation,” Management Science 47(9), September
2001, pp1282-1289.
[4] Dellarocas, C., “Digitization of Word-of-Mouth:
Promise and Challenges of Online Feedback
Mechanisms,” Management Science 49(10), 2003,
pp1407-1424.
[5] Fombrun, C., and Shanley, M. “What's in a name?
Reputation Building and Corporate Strategy,”
Academy of Management Journal 33(2), June 1990,
pp233-258.
[6] Ganesan, S. “Determinants of Long-Term
Orientation in Buyer-Seller Relationships,” Journal
of Marketing (58:2), April 1994, pp1-19.
[7] Hu, X., Z. Lin, A. B. Whinston., and H. Zhang,
“Perceived Risk and Escrow Adoption: An
Economic
Analysis
in
Online
Consumer-to-consumer Auction Markets,” The
Proceedings of ICIS 2001, 2001, pp271-274.
[8] Jarvenpaa, S. L., N. Tractinsky, and M. Vitale,
“Consumer Trust in an Internet Store,” Information

Technology and Management 1(1-2), 2000, pp
45-71.
[9] Lin, Z., D. Li, B. Janamanchi, and W. Huang,
“Reputation
Distribution
and
Consumer-to-Consumer Online Auction Market
Structure,” Decision Support Systems, 2004,
forthcoming.
[10] MacCrimmon, K, R. and D. A. Wehrung, Taking
Risks:The Management of Uncertainty, Free Press,
New York, 1986.
[11] March, J.G., and Z. Shapira, “Managerial
Perspectives on risk and risk taking,” Management
Science 33, 1987, pp1401-1418.
[12] Quelch, J. A., and L. R. Klein, “The Internet and
International Marketing,” Sloan Management
Review 37(3), 1996, pp60-75.
[13] Resnick, P., R. Zeckhauser, J. Swanson, and K.
Lockwood, “The Value of Reputation on eBay: A
Controlled Experiment,” Working paper, 2004.
[14] Tadelis, S., “What’s in a Name? Reputation as a
Tradable Asset,” The American Economic Review
(89:3), June 1999, pp548-563.

APPENDIX:
A1: EBay’s reputation forum before 2004
Feedback Summary

ID card

899 positives. 808 are from unique users.
3 neutrals.

PQRtraders ( 807

)

Member since: Wednesday, Jul 05, 2000 Location: United States

Summary of Most Recent Reviews

1 negatives. 1 are from unique users.

See all feedback reviews for PQRtraders.

A2: EBay’s reputation forum since 2004
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Past 7 days

Past month

Past 6 mo.

Positive

7

30

88

Neutral

1

1

1

Negative

0

0

0

Total

8

31

89

Bid Retractions

0

0

0

